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ABSTRACT
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making (TSCD) is introduced as
an applied theory describing the way decision-makers experience a risk or crisis and
prioritize their strategic communication responses to maintain positive relationships
with their publics. Relational Dialectics Theory is applied to illustrate how tensions
between organizations and publics influence communication decisions. The strategic
messages used by the World Health Organization regarding the Zika virus mega-crisis
provide a backdrop illustrating how TSCD is enacted. Theoretical and practical implications for decision-making suggest that TSCD contributes to a more robust understanding of how the changing context in a crisis prompts the prioritization of strategic
messages.
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When risk or crisis situations occur, organizations find themselves in the position of needing to respond. The means by which
they choose to address these situations has been labeled risk or
crisis communication. Broadly, communication scholars have
identified and assessed the risk and crisis communication used
by organizations to reestablish or improve their image to recover
from crises. Coombs and Holladay (1996) proposed, and Coombs
(2007, 2012, 2013) further developed, a typology (Situational
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Crisis Communication Theory), suggesting that if crisis types
were identified in particular stages, and crisis managers understood the kinds of crisis situations they were experiencing, their
risk and crisis communication could be matched to the crisis type
to enhance effectiveness. Benoit (1997, 2015, 2018) introduced,
and subsequently expanded upon, image restoration/repair as the
means to identify the different ways an entity could frame their
crisis response and assess its effectiveness. Additionally, scholars
have focused on the identification and assessment of particular
risk and crisis communication choices made by organizations in
crisis (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2016; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002; Sellnow et
al., 2009; Ulmer et al., 2018; Weick, 1993).
As would be expected, responses embodying best practices
(Seeger, 2006) were determined to have helped organizations
effectively manage their risk or crisis situations (Reierson et al.,
2009; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002; Sellnow et al., 2009), while other
research revealed ineffective communication choices resulting
from a reliance on routine procedures, delayed response, or failure
to take ownership, to name a few bad practices (e.g., Cummings,
1992; Farrell, 2015; Johnson, 2003). These and other studies analyzed risk and crisis situations after the fact and lacked a focus
on the tensions that decision-makers within organizations experienced, no matter which communication strategy ultimately was
chosen. This gap in addressing how decision-makers determine
the communication strategies they choose to disseminate, and the
call for “new approaches, theories, and insights about crisis and
risk communication” (Liu, 2019, p. 9), is the focus of the present
study exploring the processes of decision-making as a crisis situation unfolds.
The identification and interaction of tensions or choices for
decision-makers, manifested in strategic messages created in
response to risk or crisis situations, represents a discursive struggle, and is reflected in the prioritization of tensions through content. This discursive struggle reflects the change in prioritization
within the strategic decision-making process that produces the
communication disseminated from an organization as a crisis
evolves. Understanding how decision-makers come to their choice
of strategy is essential because it provides insight into the dynamic
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context of a crisis as it moves from the pre-crisis phase to the
post-crisis phase.
As such, the Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making (TSCD) is introduced as an applied theory describing the way decision-makers experience a risk or crisis situation
and prioritize the competing tensions shaping their strategic communication responses in order to maintain positive relationships
between themselves and their publics. In this essay, the theoretical
origins of TSCD are presented, followed by the tenets and conditions of TSCD. Using the strategic communication responses
of the World Health Organization to the Zika virus, the utility of
TSCD is revealed, followed by discussion and directions for future
research.

Theoretical Grounding
Decision-Making
When a crisis presents itself, organizations and entities are confronted with a set of circumstances and must respond accordingly. The decision-makers in these circumstances can rely upon
communication scholars to provide them with recommendations
about what form of risk and crisis communication they should use
to maximize their mitigation efforts. Reynolds and Seeger (2005)
introduced Crisis Emergency Risk Communication as a model
whereby publics could be educated, behaviors changed, information and warnings made, and publics ultimately would be prepared. Other scholars have offered similar strategies found to be
successful in particular crisis situations (e.g., Avery, 2019; Bakker
et al., 2019; Dowell, 2016; Stern, 2003), and have addressed the
need for organizations to understand the kinds of crises they are
confronting to select the matching persuasive tactics (Gribas et al.,
2018). However, what has been lacking in these studies is a focus
on the dynamics of the decision-making process, particularly what
happens when the crisis changes after the initial communication
strategy has been introduced.
Some argue that a crisis becomes a threat to an organization when its decision-makers have not anticipated the
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situation (Hermann & Dayton, 2009; Stern, 2003). For example, if
decision-makers anticipate a crisis, they will have more time to
engage others and be innovative in their response. If there is no
time, decision-makers will follow their reflexes and reach closure
quickly about how to manage the crisis. What research has suggested is that instead of exploring a range of alternatives, policymakers:
are more likely to focus on one or two options rather than to explore
a range of possible alternatives . . . and are likely to become involved
in a number of credibility traps that limit their effectiveness with the
media and public. (Hermann & Dayton, 2009, p. 238)

There are organizational risks if policymakers fail to consider the
decision-making process before a crisis emerges. Those who do not
consider the dynamic nature of a crisis and the process of determining a range of strategic communication choices are more likely
to be ineffective in maintaining positive relationships (Gribas et
al., 2018). Research shows that decision-makers have strong cognitive biases (e.g., overconfidence, confirmation bias, and reliance
on groupthink) that discourage them from thinking about risk and
crisis situations until they happen (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). These
decision-makers run the risk of not being able to adjust their communication strategies as the situation changes because they have
not considered their crisis response as a dynamic process (Boin et
al., 2005).
Additionally, research has not explored what happens when
crises change after an initial communication response has been
implemented. Within risk and crisis communication, no theory or explanation identifies the interplay or forces affecting the
decision-making process. Decision theory is closest to what is
occurring within an organization as management and leaders are
“counseling . . . to make the most effective decision” (Fearn-Banks,
2016, p. 19). The focus on identifying the communication strategies considered as best practices has neglected the matter of how
the decision-makers arrived at decisions as they experienced the
stages of the crisis.
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Identification of Tensions
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making
(TSCD) evolved from Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT). As
Baxter (1990) described, tensions represent oppositional forces
in an interpersonal relationship (e.g., closedness-openness,
autonomy-connection, predictability-novelty), whose interaction
can enable the individuals involved to maintain the relationship
over time. Baxter and Simon (1993) clarified: “The natural path
for all relationships is one of pressure toward change which results
from the dynamic tensions of simultaneous opposing forces”
(p. 226). Simply put, as the dynamic of a relationship changes,
both parties need to adjust behaviors for relational maintenance.
Regarding the current study, Baxter (2011) broadened the
application of RDT to clarify that discourses include competing
themes within the message. Thus, “objects of analysis are the discourses” (Baxter, 2011, p. 18). This characterization of discursive
struggle and competing discourses suggests that tensions may be
regarded as competing themes to be prioritized within the construction of a crisis message.
In contrast to interpersonal relationships, Mumby (2005)
approached dialectical tensions by identifying the vantage point
of oppositional forces as they appeared in organizational settings.
He based his views on the work of scholars who established conditions by which the tensions and contradictions could be viewed
interactively. As Mumby (2005) clarified: “With its focus on the
indeterminacy of organizational meanings and practices, dialectics refuses a monologic reading that reifies practice as either resistant or dominant” (p. 38).
Mumby (2005) further extended RDT, examining its function
in risk and crisis situations between organizations and their publics.
These external relationships, “intersect in the moment to moment
to produce complex and often contradictory dynamics of control
and resistance” (Mumby, 2005, p. 21) and reflect similar oppositional forces, herein after referred to as tensions. These tensions
manifest themselves when a risk or crisis occurs and present the
decision-makers with a range of choices about how to respond. To
explore these oppositional forces, Littlefield et al. (2012) identified
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seven tensions affecting relationships between organizations and
their publics when confronting risk and crisis situations. Littlefield
and Sellnow (2015) called for further examination of the interaction of these tensions as a discursive struggle, as clarified by Baxter
(2011) in the prioritization of the tensions within the ordering of
the message.
The Use and Interaction of Tensions
on Strategic Communication
In the context of risk and crisis communication, the relationship
between an organization and its publics is maintained through
strategic communication choices. As Seeger (2006) summarized,
best practices are strategic choices found to be consistently helpful in navigating the relationship between organizations and their
publics during risk and crisis events. However, our understanding of these best practices expands by contending that their selection and use does not occur randomly. Rather, such selection is
prompted by the identification and prioritization of tensions that
arise during a risk or crisis. What follows are two propositions
and their undergirding conditions that make up the tenets of the
TSCD.
Proposition 1. Risk and crisis situations prompt dialectical tensions
for decision-makers seeking to prevent or mitigate harm to themselves, their organization, or to their publics.

Existing typologies reflect the model whereby risk and crisis
situations occur, and organizations respond with communication
strategies to mitigate the crisis. As an example, Coombs and Holladay (2002) demonstrated through SCCT that crisis types influence
the selection of particular response strategies used to protect an
organization’s reputation. This view later enabled Coombs (2014),
and other scholars, to determine the effectiveness of strategies,
but offered little insight into how the decision-makers arrived at
the strategies they ultimately used. Similarly, as the dynamics of a
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crisis change, the initial strategy used by an organization may need
modification. The introduction of dialectical tensions into the
model enables the decision-maker to modify an initial response
based upon the prioritization of these tensions.
Condition 1. Dialectical tensions prompted by the risk and crisis
are identifiable, mutually exclusive, interactive, and measurable on
continuums representing oppositional dimensions.

When crises occur, seven identifiable tensions emerge for
decision-makers as they consider their responses (Littlefield
et al., 2012). These tensions are mutually exclusive in that they
utilize specific vocabulary pertaining to their point of focus. For
example, timeliness pertains to the point in a crisis when the
decision-makers weigh when to present information to various
publics. Similarly, tensions are interactive because one tension
may supersede another. It follows that the interaction of timeliness and level of certainty might play out in the case where a CEO
delayed the timing of a press conference due to uncertainty about
information confirming whether the organization was responsible
for the crisis. Finally, the tensions are measurable on continuums
representing oppositional dimensions (e.g., full or partial disclosure of information to little or no disclosure).
Condition 2. Tensions are not inherently prioritized for decisionmakers in risk and crisis situations.

The presence of seven tensions does not prioritize their level
of importance because each risk or crisis is unique. Thus, when
a crisis occurs, all the tensions are present in no apparent order.
Each of the tensions poses a question for the decision-makers that
must be addressed. The nature of the crisis will influence the way
decision-makers choose to prioritize content strategically in the
construction of their messages. The prioritization of tensions constitutes what Baxter (2011) described as “the interplay of competing discourses” (p. 18).
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TABLE 1 Seven Tensions for Strategic Communication Decision-Making
Dialectical
Tension

Continuum
Anchors

Description

Timeliness

Immediate to
Never

Immediate: Messages are
presented to publics upon learning
information.
Never: Messages are not presented
after a period of time.

Amount of
Information

Everything to
Nothing

Everything: Available information is
fully disclosed to publics.
Nothing: Available information is
kept from the publics.

Certainty of
Information

Verified to
Unverified

Verified: Organization expresses
certainty of the information revealed
to the publics.
Unverified: Organization expresses
uncertainty of the information
revealed to the publics.

Interest

Self-interest
to Concern for
Others

Self-interest: Message reflects a
focus on prioritizing the interests of
the organization over the interests
of the publics.
Concern for others: Message reflects
a focus on prioritizing the interests
of the publics over the interests of
the organization.

Control of the
Narrative

Total Control to
No Control

Total Control: Organization
maintains control of the messages/
narratives in the media.
No Control: There are multiple
voices in the media.

Emotional
Connection

Total Connection Total Connection: Messages reflect a
to No Connection level of full sensitivity to the publics.
No Connection: Messages reflect no
level of sensitivity to the publics.

Level of
Responsibility

All to None

All: Organization claims full
responsibility for the crisis.
None: Organization denies
responsibility for the crisis.
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TABLE 2 Audience-Focused Best Practices, Tensions, and Questions to
Consider
Best Practices

Tensions

Questions to Consider

Meeting the needs of the
media
Being accessible

Timeliness

When should the
organization be releasing
information about the crisis
to the media and the public?
How much information
should the organization
reveal to the media and the
public?
How much control of the
crisis response narrative can
the organization maintain
through one or more
spokespeople?

Amount of
information
Control of the
narrative

Accepting uncertainty
and ambiguity
Collaborating and
coordinating with
credible sources

Confidence in
information

How certain is the
organization about the
information to be revealed
to the public?

Hearing and
understanding public’s
concerns
Fostering partnerships

Prioritization of
interest

Whose interest—the
organization’s or the
public’s—should be
prioritized as the crisis is
managed?

Pre-event planning and
preparedness
Viewing risk and crisis
communication as
process

Level of
responsibility

How much responsibility
should the organization take
for causing the crisis?

Hearing and
understanding public’s
concerns
Being candid, open, and
honest with the public

Emotional
connection

How much of an emotional
connection should the
organization maintain with
the public?
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Condition 3. Tensions may cluster and intensify based upon the
complexity of the crisis.

While condition 2 suggests that every crisis prompts the
emergence of tensions for decision-makers, tensions may cluster,
resulting in a discursive struggle for prioritization. For example,
when information about a crisis becomes available, the amount of
information to be presented and who should present the information may prompt prioritization. Later, once the decision-makers
are more certain about the cause of the crisis, the tensions comprising level of responsibility, level of interest, and emotional connection may cluster to reflect the interplay of discourses necessary
to demonstrate the level of concern expressed by the organization
for the publics impacted by a crisis. These clusters may present
themselves at any time during the management of the crisis as
decision-makers navigate their relationship with various publics.
Proposition 2. Strategic communication responses enacted by
organizations are outcomes of the dialectical tensions identified and
prioritized by decision-makers and acted upon by publics in risk
and crisis situations.

As risk and crisis situations occur, decision-makers have the
capacity to frame how their messages are crafted in response to
changing contexts. For example, Benoit’s (2015) image repair
typology provided a means by which messages could be created
in order to frame how they would be received (e.g., mortification,
corrective action). Depending upon the context, decision-makers
make choices, like how Goffman (1974) characterized and prioritized primary and social frameworks.
McCombs and Shaw (1972) labeled this prioritization process for the mass media as “the agenda-setting function” (p. 176).
Through agenda-setting, the media not only provide information (primary framework) for the publics, but also through their
placement of the information (social frameworks), determine its
importance. Similarly, in the context of risk and crisis, decisionmakers have the capacity to frame how their strategic messages
are crafted for publics in response to changing contexts. It is in
response to how publics respond to messages that Perelman and
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Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1971) identified the presence of universal
and particular audiences. They suggested that with multiple publics, decision-makers must be conscious about how their messages
may be perceived by all publics to determine their effectiveness.
Condition 4. The perceptions of decision-makers about the prioritization of competing discourses may shift during a crisis resulting in
an interpenetration of tensions reflecting the decision-makers’ use
of the central issue of power (dominant to marginal) to prioritize
message content.

In the pre-crisis phase, strategic decision-makers may respond
with messages to prevent or control a crisis from materializing.
For example, to discourage people from spreading a contagious
virus, public health decision-makers initially may use an interplay
of the Surgeon General (prioritizing the control of the narrative)
providing information (prioritizing the amount of information)
demonstrating certainty about the relationship of wearing a mask
and social distancing to the prevention of spreading the virus (prioritizing the level of certainty). However, once a virus has been
detected within a population, public health officials may marginalize their earlier discourses that emphasized early prevention and
treatment (prioritizing timeliness), suggesting ways to deal with
the effects of the virus (prioritizing the level of interest), and showing sensitivity toward the patients and families of victims of the
virus (prioritizing their emotional connection).
Condition 5. The utilization of the best practices of risk and crisis
communication enhances public perceptions of the strategic communication and the management of the risk and crisis.

Seeger (2006) and others suggested that when organizations
utilize best practices, the affected publics perceive their efforts
more positively (McKnight & Linnenluecke, 2016; Veil et al.,
2020). Thus, decision-makers may respond to the tensions by
choosing, from among the best practices, those that are primarily audience-focused (Littlefield, 2013) (See Table 2). For example,
being accessible to the media and publics is a best practice associated with timeliness, amount of information, and level of certainty.
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Being empathetic and sincere with publics is associated with the
focus of interest and emotional connection.
Condition 6. The relational intent of the decision-makers toward
publics modifies the prioritization of tensions and the implementation of strategic communication choices.

This condition presents itself when risk or crisis decisionmakers initially may have chosen a communication strategy not
well-received by publics. For example, decision-makers may not
have prioritized the importance of controlling the narrative at the
start of the crisis, allowing for the emergence of multiple spokespersons presenting conflicting information. Upon perceiving
the deteriorating support of their position with affected publics,
decision-makers may later prioritize the controlling of the narrative and identify one credible and respected authority to speak on
their behalf.
These propositions and conditions constitute the Tensions of
Strategic Communication Decision-Making (TSCD) and suggest that decision-makers identify particular tensions, prioritize
the tensions within the themes of the discourse based upon the
context of the risk or crisis situation, and respond with strategic
communication choices based upon their prioritization. This strategic communication may represent a broad range of choices, with
effectiveness determined by how well the messages are received
and measured by the publics involved.

Method
To illustrate the descriptive power of TSCD, a case study approach
using a contemporary mega-crisis was identified. Case studies commonly are used when studying risk and crisis situations (Sellnow
et al., 2009). Additionally, Baxter (2011) supported qualitative or
interpretive methods as appropriate to examine “the interplay of
competing discourses” (p. 18) and called on researchers studying
RDT to use “a variety of methods to understand both the culture
and the relational history in which a [text] is embedded” (p. 159).
Some scholars have described mega-crises as large-scale events
or risks that may create significant, ongoing, and even existential

The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making

223

threats to communities, groups, and organizations (Helsloot et al.,
2012; Yen & Salmon, 2017). The Zika crisis was identified as the
mega-crisis in the present study for several reasons. First, the Zika
virus crossed geographic boundaries (Romero, 2016). In addition, Zika constituted an international public health emergency.
Prior to the Zika virus, it was only the fourth time the WHO had
issued such a warning (previous alerts were for Ebola, Swine Flu,
and Polio), and the first time for a mosquito-borne illness (Vickery, 2016). Finally, the Zika virus represented a threat due to the
absence of immunity in the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean (Duffy & Brasileiro, 2016).
The Case
The selected crisis—the Zika virus and its effect on humans, and
especially pregnant women—provided a backdrop for an illustration of how decision-makers strategically responded in a crisis.
The contextual background for this study was drawn from a LexisNexis search of several hundred newspapers, magazines, and other
online sources, beginning when the virus was first detected in 1947
until February 2016 when a state of crisis was declared in several
Latin American countries, as well as in several parts of the United
States of America. A total of 136 news articles were selected by
removing duplicates and including only those that specifically
included information pertinent to the emerging 2016 Zika virus
on the American continents.
Data Set
The data set included public communication messages designated
as “Disease Outbreak News” by the WHO on its official website, as
the Zika virus was emerging as a major health crisis from October
2015 to February 2016. Baxter (2011) described this type of data
as dialogically expansive because of the multiple themes or discourses interacting within the messages over time. Twenty-four
official reports were collected from the WHO website during this
period, with paragraphs serving as the unit of analysis. The number of paragraphs in each message ranged from two to 16 (M = 6
paragraphs per message).
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Procedures
The 24 WHO messages were ordered chronologically to reveal
the progression of strategic communication responses. The paragraphs in each message were numbered sequentially (1, 2, 3 . . .)
following the agenda-setting technique known as the inverted pyramid style of writing whereby the most important information is
placed first in the news story (Harrower, 2012). Each paragraph
was coded by two researchers to identify the presence and level of
one or more tensions in its content, along with how the content
of each paragraph revealed dialectical tensions associated with
elements of the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2. The coders
found 100% agreement (Neuendorf, 2002) on the identification
of all tensions, with the exception of the level of responsibility. In
that case, the coders initially found 70% agreement. Subsequently,
through discussion of the different levels (e.g., individual, state)
consensus was achieved.
Content was noted by specific descriptors and coded accordingly. For example, if the data specified, “we wanted to get this
information out immediately to the publics,” the data were coded
as prioritizing timeliness. If the data specified, “we are unsure at
this time about the cause of the birth defects of children born of
women who contracted the virus,” the data were coded as marginalizing the level of certainty.
The 136 news articles providing contextual information about
Zika virus were read by the lead researcher multiple times to identify elements associated with the conditions in Proposition 2.
Those articles directly quoting individuals or official spokespersons were identified and their remarks were chosen as exemplars
reflecting public opinion as reported by the media.

Results
Proposition 1. Condition 1
Proposition 1 claims that risk and crisis situations prompt dialectical tensions for decision-makers seeking to prevent or mitigate
harm to themselves or to their publics. To validate this proposition, Condition 1 suggests that dialectical tensions are identifiable,
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mutually exclusive, interactive, and measurable on continuums
representing levels of oppositional dimensions. The data revealed
evidence of the seven tensions in all 24 messages, where they were
found to be mutually exclusive as evident by coder agreement,
interactive by virtue of multiple tensions being identified in one or
more paragraphs, and oppositional.
Timeliness (Immediate to Never)
All 24 messages included the immediacy of timeliness in their first
paragraphs by citing the specific date when WHO identified a case
of Zika virus, with 83.33% of the messages being published within
9 days of the specific date identified in paragraph 1. For example, a
message published on January 27 cited January 23 in paragraph 1
(difference of 4 days) as the date when Zika was detected.
Amount of Information (Everything to None)
Sixteen of the messages included some amount of content in one
or more paragraphs about the Zika virus and/or ways to prevent
exposure, while eight provided no background information (e.g.,
history of the virus, where Zika had been clinically identified) or
mitigation strategies (e.g., what people should wear or do to avoid
contracting the virus).
Certainty of Information (Verified to Unverified)
All 24 messages included indicators of certainty by mentioning
laboratory confirmed or unconfirmed cases of Zika. Nineteen
(70.16%) prioritized laboratory confirmation of Zika in paragraph
1, with an additional 10 messages providing certainty in paragraph
2. Four messages included paragraphs mentioning varying levels of uncertainty related to the Zika virus. For example, “despite
reports of a potential association between Zika virus and microcephaly (e.g., a rare neurological condition where a baby’s head
is much smaller than expected) and other neurological disorders,
a causal relationship between these events has not yet been confirmed” (WHO, 2016a).
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Control of the Narrative (Total Control to No Control)
All 24 messages included paragraphs with WHO pronouncements, protocol, plans, or other authoritative recommendations.
For example, WHO controlled the narrative by being the agency
receiving reports identifying detection of the Zika virus infections.
The use of the phrase, “WHO recommends . . .” in more than half
of the messages demonstrated the control WHO exercised regarding its strategic communication, and it was WHO that reported
what was being done to counter or prevent the effects of Zika virus.
One message referenced another agency—the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)—as providing the confirmatory
test to identify the presence of the Zika virus.
Level of Responsibility (All to None).
The messages included the identification of those entities who
should be responsible for acting. Three messages prioritized the
WHO as being responsible to oversee the detection and prevention
activities of its member states and to provide technical orientation for appropriate pesticide use. Seventeen messages prioritized
specific country governments (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador)
as being responsible to detect, prevent, and help with potential
victims of the Zika virus. One message indicated that pregnant
women were responsible for taking their own preventive action.
Four messages did not place responsibility for action on any entity.
Focus of Interest (Self-Interest to Concern for Others).
In 23 of the messages, the content prioritized the focus of interest
on those other than the decision-maker (WHO). In other words,
the warnings were directed at potential victims of the Zika virus,
particularly “people traveling to high risk areas, especially pregnant women,” young children, and the elderly (WHO, 2016a).
Only one of the messages did not direct the focus of interest to self
or others.
Emotional Connection (Total Connection to No Connection).
In this category, the identification of vulnerable groups, the use of
language choices reflecting cultural sensitivity, and efforts to reach
out to provide support for victims were prioritized in varying

The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making

227

degrees. Ten of the messages did not provide any mention of these
elements. In fact, no emotional connection was offered in the first
nine messages (October 21 to December 21, 2016) included in
the data set. However, after this initial period, the subsequent 14
messages included varying levels of reference to vulnerable groups
(especially pregnant women, children, and the elderly), areas of
high risk (Central and South America), language sensitivity, and
victim support.
Proposition 1. Condition 2
Condition 2 validates Proposition 1 by suggesting that responses
to tensions are not inherently prioritized for decision-makers in
risk and crisis situations. In the present study, content reflecting
all seven tensions was found in the 24 messages under review.
However, their prioritized placement varied in the messages as the
spread of the virus increased. Specifically, when considering the
content of the dominant discourses prioritized in the first paragraphs of the 24 messages, the following tensions were identified:
Timeliness—100%, level of certainty—79%, level of responsibility—21%, amount of information—8%, and control of the narrative—4%. The discourses marginalized by omission in the first
paragraphs included focus of interest and emotional connection.
In contrast, even as the crisis progressed, the discourses associated with two tensions (control of the narrative—96% and focus of
interest—33%) were marginalized until the last paragraphs of each
of the 24 messages. Finally, the discourse associated with emotional connection consistently was marginalized to the final two
paragraphs in 12 of the messages (50%).
Proposition 1. Condition 3
Condition 3 provides clarification for Proposition 1 by identifying
that tensions cluster and change in priority prompted by the complexity of the crisis. The data revealed the clustering of tensions
at all stages of the crisis under investigation. For example, at the
beginning of the crisis, skepticism about the spread and implications of the Zika virus confronted decision-makers. This prompted
the WHO to prioritize two tensions: getting the message out to
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affected publics (timeliness) and providing verification that the
Zika virus was being clinically detected (certainty). The dominance
of these tensions prompted decision-makers to include up-to-date
and scientifically confirmed content at or near the beginning of all
24 messages in the ongoing discourse of the WHO.
Because the priority for decision-makers was on timing and
certainty, the emphasis on those groups being affected by the virus
was marginalized by omission from the beginning of the messages.
Thus, while the WHO messages always addressed the welfare of
those who had contracted the Zika virus (focus of interest), the
interplay of messages with specific references to vulnerable people
(e.g., pregnant women, children born with microcephaly, people
living in poverty) using culturally-sensitive strategies (emotional
connection) took 2 months of changing contexts to become more
prominent in the messages.
Proposition 2. Condition 4
Proposition 2 describes how the strategic communication responses
enacted by organizations are prioritized by decision-makers and
acted upon by publics in risk and crisis situations. In Condition
4, as the perceptions of decision-makers about the prioritization
of tensions shifted, different strategic communication responses
were enacted. For example, while the prioritization of immediacy
resulted in the maintenance of a consistent communication strategy to get the information out as quickly as possible following the
identification of the Zika virus in a particular area, the discourse
associated with prioritizing the other-serving focus of interest
shifted throughout the crisis.
In the pre-crisis stage, strategic communication responses
were preventive. For example, following the WHO’s prioritization,
pre-crisis messages came in the form of general warnings or suggested prevention strategies: “Public Health Agency of Canada . . .
recommends that pregnant women discuss any travel plans with
their health care providers” (Ubelacker, 2016). Later, when the
crisis grew in scope and people continued to travel to high risk
regions, the messages became more explicit: “These steps include
wearing insect repellent, using air conditioning or window and
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door screens to keep mosquitoes outside, wearing long pants and
long-sleeved shirts when possible, and emptying standing water
inside and outside the home” (“Washington: CDC warns,” 2016).
Regarding the prioritization of information to reveal how the
Zika virus spread, as scientists became more certain, more specific
information was forthcoming and placed earlier in the messages.
For example, the initial transmission of the Zika virus was traced
to the bite of the Aedes aegypti mosquito. This prompted the prioritization of that content in the messages (13 messages included
this content in the first half of the paragraphs) to “reduce the mosquitoes that transmit this disease” (WHO, 2015b). When it was
later detected that Zika could be transmitted through sexual intercourse (WHO, 2016b), content was prioritized to identify methods of birth control (e.g., abstinence, use of condoms).
Proposition 2. Condition 5
Condition 5 explains how Proposition 2 is acted upon by publics
because the utilization of best practices enhances public perceptions of the prioritized strategic communication in risk and crisis
situations. In the present study, the uncertainty associated with
the Zika virus and microcephaly illustrated this relationship. As
the connection between the Zika virus and microcephaly became
more certain, women who were pregnant or were anticipating pregnancy became more anxious, as the following statement demonstrated: “All of the women I see at the hospital or in my office who
are pregnant or wanting to get pregnant are very alarmed, almost
panicky” (“Brazil fears birth defects,” 2016).
The extreme reactions of women prompted decisionmakers to prioritize strategic messages reflecting the best practices of hearing and understanding publics’ concerns (tensions of
emotional connection and prioritization of interest) and accepting
uncertainty and ambiguity (tension of confidence in information).
The WHO prioritized the following specific strategies: “To provide self-efficacy for those at risk or already infected with the Zika
virus” (WHO, 2015d); to address the presence or absence of certainty (WHO, 2015c); and by withholding total certainty about the
link between the Zika virus and microcephaly (Goodhue, 2016).
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By foregrounding content about the confirmation process for
publics, decision-makers enacted the best practice of being candid, open, and honest. Through collaboration and coordination
with the CDC, WHO prioritized content supporting its advisory
warning that travel should be postponed for pregnant women, or
women anticipating pregnancy, due to the risk of a relationship
between the virus and the birth defect. These warnings were heard,
and people’s reactions were those of adherence (Umeha, 2016).
Proposition 2. Condition 6
Proposition 2 is understood further because in Condition 6 the
relational intent of decision-makers with the publics modifies
the interplay of tensions and the prioritization of strategic communication choices. In most cases, relational intent best can be
described as helpful, hurtful, or neutral. Littlefield and Sellnow
(2015) described these intents, suggesting that a neutral intent also
may be hurtful when decision-makers do not respond to the tension of level of responsibility and take some form of action.
In the case of the Zika virus, all of the WHO messages except
one prioritized a response to the tension of level of interest, with
a focus on helping the publics to avoid contracting the virus and
potentially affecting the health of unborn fetuses. In the one message where a neutral intent was coded, WHO identified geographic
areas as the focus of interest, as the virus was “spreading geographically to previously unaffected areas” (WHO, 2016a).
Additionally, as the crisis intensified, the helpful content prioritized by the decision-makers shifted to respond to the potential
health hazards for pregnant women and their unborn fetuses. For
example, when prioritized content described the threat of the Zika
as “virus consisting of mild fever, rash . . . , headaches, arthralgia, myalgia, asthenia, and non-purulent conjunctivitis, occurring three to twelve days after the mosquito vector bite” (WHO,
2015a), the discourses were designed to encourage women to
delay or cancel travel to areas of risk. As more became known
about the possible link between Zika and microcephaly, designing messages that prioritized the strategy of advising women to
avoid pregnancy by abstinence or the use of contraceptives represented a more intrusive approach to controlling the spread of the
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virus. This recommendation to avoid pregnancy was not valued
universally, as it represented what decision-makers in the Catholic
Church characterized as a hurtful intent (Partlow, 2016).

Discussion
The analysis of strategic communication decision-making during
the Zika virus mega-crisis illustrates the utility of TSCD to enhance
our understanding of the processes at work when decisionmakers construct messages reflecting a discursive struggle during
the ongoing phases of a risk or crisis event. The responses of WHO
provided insight into how the crisis context likely influenced the
prioritizing of messages reflecting the competing tensions. This
application of TSCD provides theoretical and practical implications for scholars and risk and crisis decision-makers.
Theoretical Implications
This study fills a void in the literature by providing a clearer focus
on the dynamics of the decision-making process in changing crisis situations after the initial communication strategies have been
implemented. As Ha and Boynton (2014) suggested, the focus of
research has rarely been on those who make the decisions even
though crisis decisions are made by leaders in an environment of
competing messages (Boin et al., 2005). By accounting for the tensions experienced by the decision-makers as they make sense of a
crisis, this study contends that such an analysis reveals more clearly
how organizational leaders prioritize the range of their communication choices when developing messages for different publics. In
addition, a more robust understanding is possible regarding how
strategic choices are made and modified throughout the phases of
a crisis (Hermann & Dayton, 2009).
This unique application of the interpersonal relational dialectics theory to risk and crisis provides for a deeper understanding of how decision-makers must respond to a crisis as a dynamic
event—whereby communication strategies must change as a
result of changing circumstances—and organizations maintain
or rebuild positive relationships with their publics. Through an
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analysis of discursive messages prioritizing responses to prevent
or mitigate a crisis, researchers can account for the prioritization
and interplay of those tensions on changing messages as the crisis
unfolds (Gribas et al., 2018).
The interplay of the competing discourses within messages
and the necessary prioritization of decision-makers as they confront what Baxter (2011) labeled “turning points” or “moments of
change” (p. 154), illustrate the complexity involved in the process
of message creation in a dynamic context of crisis. Essentially, the
changing crisis context prompts changes in the prioritization of
discourses within the messages, just as the changing dynamics in
an interpersonal relationship necessitate oppositional responses to
alter the situation.
While the introduction of competing discourses prompts contradictory responses (Baxter, 2011), this study reinforces the position that competing discourses can be identified through content,
and, thereby through placement, reflect the prioritization of the
decision-maker for the publics. Through this interplay of the competing discourses, Baxter (2011) suggested that meaning is created. By focusing on the prioritization of discourses within risk or
crisis messages, the processes of decision-making may be revealed
more fully.
This study extends the theoretical understanding of decisionmaking by illustrating the dynamic discursive struggle of all seven
tensions within the ongoing risk and crisis messages and the subsequent best practices used by decision-makers in risk or crisis contexts. Accepting Baxter’s (2011) broader characterization—that
competing discourses within a message (e.g., tensions) may be the
objects of analysis—enabled this study to use tensions as representations of discourses prioritized by decision-makers based upon
where content addressing these tensions was placed within the
messages. Particularly, the findings revealed the interactive nature
of the tensions as their prioritization within the messages changed
when the risk or crisis context moved through the crisis phases.
By revealing the discursive struggle reflecting the prioritized tensions within the risk or crisis messages, this study helps scholars to
understand the processes associated with decision-making within
the changing context of a risk or crisis.
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Practical Implications
This study offers several practical implications for risk and crisis
communication scholars and decision-makers. Initially, TSCD
provides a frame of reference for examining and organizing each
of the seven tensions experienced by all decision-makers. In crisis situations, spokespeople such as Public Information Officers
respond because, through communication, they can describe,
interpret, and evaluate what is happening for their stakeholders
and publics (Avery, 2019). Furthermore, understanding these tensions could help emergency managers and others develop crisis
simulations and other drills to help better prepare crisis managers
to communicate well during a crisis. As decision-makers create
their strategic messages, they prioritize their competing discourses
in the message based upon which tensions they perceive to be of
greatest importance to the publics.
By using the continuums associated with each of the tensions, decision-makers prioritize the levels of openness or certainty, the amounts of information to share, and degrees to which
they assumed responsibility, expressed concern, or directed their
focus of interest. In addition, the interplay between the tensions is
observable as the crisis evolves when certain tensions take precedence and are prioritized by the decision-makers in their strategic
messages. By identifying tensions as discursive messages (Baxter,
2011), the TSCD theory provides clues regarding why particular best practices should be used when communicating about the
phases of the crisis as the tensions cluster in different combinations.
Previous research in risk and crisis communication has retrospectively provided researchers and practitioners the opportunity
to identify emerging best practices and to evaluate their effectiveness in preventing, mitigating, or renewing after crisis situations
(e.g., Lachlan et al., 2018; Stewart & Young, 2018; Ulmer et al.,
2018). In contrast, the utility of recognizing the tensions confronting decision-makers prior to the selection of particular best
practices helps scholars to explore new aspects of risk and crisis
communication as the prioritization of tensions shifts during crisis, producing interaction that may or may not make the adoption
of particular best practices an option for future decision-makers.
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This TSCD theory is exploratory and not without limitations. In
this study, the identification of tensions of strategic communication decision-making about a mega-crisis came from written messages that were posted by the WHO on their website. While Baxter
(2011) affirmed the study of “contrasting discourses . . . in spoken or written texts” (p. 152), to understand more robustly how
decision-makers experience and prioritize tensions, scholars may
learn more if they extend the parameters of the search, gathering
responses from multiple mediums as a crisis unfolds and working
directly with decision-makers (e.g., interviews, observations, or
surveys).
A second limitation of this study is its single mega-crisis focus.
While helpful in an exploratory way, TSCD’s applicability to a
variety of different crisis contexts simultaneously would add value
and veracity to its legitimacy. For example, the novel coronavirus
COVID-19 in 2020 is a fertile area of study where politics, economics, sociology, education, and family systems offer numerous
inter-related contexts whereby the prioritization and interplay of
tensions could reveal a range of effective and ineffective communication strategies used by decision-makers in an attempt to retain or
rebuild relationships with multiple publics. Similarly, TSCD could
be used to analyze ongoing crises involving food safety, environmental security, domestic acts of violence, mass shootings, and
many other social issues. The next step for researchers is to find
ways to test the propositions and conditions, thereby confirming
or disproving TSCD’s theoretical assumptions.
Finally, the impact of the cultural context in a crisis on publics responsiveness to strategic communication choices requires
more robust examination. As such, within every crisis are cultural
variables affecting the relationship between the decision-makers
and their publics. How the decision-makers choose to strategically
communicate with their publics in times of crisis will influence
how their messages are received (Littlefield, 2013).
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Conclusion
This exploratory study introduced an applied theory describing
the processes associated with message creation by decision-makers
in risk and crisis situations; identifying how the tensions present
themselves, how they influence the prioritization of strategic communication responses, and how their interaction with best practices is affected by the context in which they are introduced. By
being attentive to these inherent tensions, scholars and observers
may better understand how their responses to manage complex
and challenging risk and crisis situations may be more strategically
utilized in the future.
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